I moved to Austin in 1994, just in time to vote for Ann Richards, and watch her lose to George W. Bush. And from the Blue Island - Travis County - I watched as a reasonably Democratic state was swamped by the red tide and turned Republican in less than a decade. Republican as in
100% of statewide elected offices are Republican Republican. And the Texas Democratic Party deserves its share of the blame for this situation.
In the following dozen years, I watched one Don Quixote after another charge up the hill - Victor Morales and his pickup truck in 1996; Garry Mauro's embarrassingly pathetic one third of the vote against Bush in 1998; the Democratic no-show against Kay Bailey Hutchison in 2000; the failure of the multi-ethnic Dream Ticket in 2002; the Democrats' futile attempts to stop DeLay's redistricting in 2003; Governor Goodhair's reelection in 2006 with 39% of the vote. [I was one of the few people in Texas not running for governor in 2006.]
I watched not only what was happening on the Blue Island, but also how these candidates were faring as they traveled outside the urban areas -- and what has happened to them since.
Here is a sampling of our former standard-bearers:
- Morales drove his truck statewide on a shoestring budget, and has since renounced the Democratic Party for its lack of support.
- Dream Ticket Attorney General candidate Kirk Watson, a former Blue Island mayor, has dropped down the ladder to become a state senator.
- Fellow Dream Ticket Senate candidate Ron Kirk abandoned politics and became one of the top lobbyists for Texas' number one polluter, utility TXU.
- 2002 Democratic gubernatorial nominee Tony Sanchez was Bush's largest donor not named Enron and endorsed GOP turncoat Carole Keeton McClellan Rylander Strayhorn for governor in 2006.
Meanwhile, since 1983, the GOP gained state senators in every session but two, and state house members every session but three.
The DNC has earned much recognition – and some well-earned criticisms – for the
50-state strategy. Our successes in Senate races alone show the merit of such a plan. Locally, the Democratic Party is still relevant in some parts of Texas. However, if the Texas Democratic Party wants to pull off a
competitive Senate victory, even against a “vulnerable” candidate like John Cornyn, it will require a 254-county strategy.
For example, the TDP does not have county chairs in six Texas counties right now. Sure, they are counties that went at least two-thirds for Bush in 2004. But there are dozens of county commission, school board, city council, and other publicly elected positions that need contesting. Though these counties make up just over one percent of Texas’ population, we are going to need that one percent some day. Our next great statewide candidate may be putting off a run for county judge in Hansford County because there is no TDP support there. Look, if America’s smallest county,
Loving County, can have a county chair for its dozen Democrats (12 votes for president in 2004; 11 votes for Senate in 2006), then the TDP should be able to chair and compete for every county in the state.
In spring 2006, the TDP got a new chairman – Boyd Richie from Young County in north Texas. So how did Democrats fare that fall in Young County? A clean sweep! Yes, Republicans won every state and federal election in Young County, all 22 of them, including 11 that the Democrats couldn’t be bothered to contest.
But wait, there’s more! In
2006, the TDP ran no candidate for District Attorney in 21 of 46 counties; 10 of 23 statewide elected offices; 16 of 31 state senate seats; 30 Courts of Appeals seats; and 99 District Judge seats.
The need for a 254-county strategy is clear. As with the Electoral College, a statewide election can be won by taking a handful of urban counties by strong margins, or by winning dozens and dozens of smaller, rural and agricultural counties. By nature, by definition, and by platform, Texas Democrats are not competing well in the nearly two hundred smaller counties. Logic and demography conclude that the key to victory is in the urban counties. However in 2004, President Bush carried all but five of the twenty largest counties (Travis, El Paso, Hidalgo, Cameron and Galveston); and in 2006, Senator Hutchison lost only three of those counties (Travis, El Paso, Hidalgo), including a 50-48 loss in El Paso County. Texas Democrats cannot concede the rural vote and then fail to win the urban vote by a wide margin.
The problems are numerous – fundraising, netroots, grass roots, developing candidates, voter registration, fielding a competitive message. And Richie says he has an
improvement plan:
1) Outreach to community and constituency leaders to develop pragmatic, cost-effective ways to communicate with and motivate the Democratic base and attract new voters to the party;
2) Coordinate efforts with County Chairs and SDEC members to provide them with the resources and tools they need to win;
3) Expand the technology the TDP uses to communicate with activists and voters alike and develop more tools like our recently-launched interactive online voter file;
4) Initiate a strategic communications plan to identify Democratic spokespersons in every media market who can appear on local radio, television and print media both in English and Spanish;
5) Reach out to large and small donors alike to raise the funds needed to keep an experienced, campaign staff and fund these programs.
Still absent from this plan is a county-level strategy.
1) Dozens of county governments and county party groups lack functioning and accurate websites. Further, voter registration drives in every county need to be incorporated here. (Yes, even in Loving County.) You can't like our message if you have never heard it.
2) The resources and tools needed to win vary wildly by county, and I have not seen any evidence yet that the party has the ability to accurately identify those things.
3) This sounds like a rehash of the first step, and it does not address the lack of activists in some counties that are in desperate need of local Democratic leadership.
4) There are some positive points here, as long as this is not limited to major print or television markets. Every county has at least one local publication that needs to be reached by the TDP.
5) The hardest part is the money, because we need money to do the other steps, but we don’t have enough partisans and activists giving enough money yet to make the rest happen. We need cost-effective ways to raise funds in the sea of small counties.
We need regional candidate training academies. We need media outreach in every county. We need locally written editorials appearing in every county, every week. We need to register voters all over the state with monthly goals in mind. We need to expand Young Democrats groups on campuses, including smaller colleges, community colleges, and high schools. We need principled and ethical elected officials to carry the standard in Austin and throughout the state. And we need a lot of money to make all of this happen.
[Cross-posted at
DailyKos.com]
